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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. DECLINING DEFENSE BUDGETS 
Since 1985, the overall military budget has decreased in 
real terms (Bixler and Jones, 1992) . This shrinkage has 
forced Pentagon and administration planners to continually 
look for innovative ways of providing more with less; more, or 
a relatively stable level of defense with fewer expenditures. 
One of the ideas developed to accomplish this has been the 
formation of a revolving fund that provides and pays for the 
maintenance and other support services needed by operating 
units. Revolving funds have been successfully used for over 
three decades by the various services and their operations 
have been well received by Congress in the past. The fund 
formed to provide these services is the Defense Business 
Operations Fund (DBOF). 
On October 1, 1991 (FY 92) , Congress approved the 
formation of the DBOF. Although it was planned for several 
years and was sold to Congress as primarily a paper change to, 
or streamlining of, the support process, the implementation of 
DBOF has not necessarily been a smooth one. 
B. REVOLVING FUND USAGE EXPANDED 
Beginning in fiscal year 1992, military support 
activities were consolidated and began operating under the 
DBOF, a revolving fund that was designed to operate military 
support activities in a businesslike manner. Operating units 
were to be viewed as customers and would be directly funded 
for the costs of their needed maintenance, supplies, etc. 
Support units were to be operated as businesses that provided 
those needed services. This alone was not radically different 
from the way defense revolving funds had operated in the past. 
What changed under DBOF was that each support unit or 
business activity was required to operate under full cost 
recovery using the unit cost concept. In the past, many costs 
such as salaries, had not been included in customer rates. 
With DBOF, the price of each unit of maintenance or service 
included all previously hidden costs, such as military 
salaries or civilian worker benefits, that went into providing 
that service. These hidden subsidies were eliminated in DBOF. 
Prices were expected to rise as these costs were included in 
the price of the service. The monies that normally went to 
support units to cover these subsidies were instead 
distributed to operating units to make up for the higher 
expected service prices. 
Viewed another way, DBOF prices were designed to recover 
overhead costs associated with producing support services and 
goods. Prior to DBOF, fleet customers had paid the direct 
cost of that service (although there was some movement away 
from this practice) . The direct price was the price that the 
government paid for the commercially procured good or, for 
government produced goods, a compilation of the direct 
materials, direct labor, etc. that went into the production of 
that good. Overhead costs, which typically include indirect 
expenses, general and administrative expenses, etc. were not 
recovered. DBOF prices include a share of overhead costs. 
Under DBOF, prices are supposed to recover the entire cost of 
operations. 
C.  AREA OF RESEARCH 
This thesis investigates the manner in which stabilized 
rates are set for DBOF activities and attempts to explain that 
process to end users. 
1.  Primary Question 
The primary question addressed in this thesis is: How 
does the DBOF determine the annual stabilized rates, how much 
do those rates fluctuate from year to year, and what are the 
driving forces behind those fluctuations? 
2.  Secondary Questions 
In  answering  the  primary  question,  the  following 
secondary questions will be addressed: 
1. What are revolving funds and why are they used? How 
does DBOF differ?  Why use DBOF? 
2. What are the potential strengths and weaknesses of 
DBOF? 
3. Is DBOF a sound idea in a time of declining (or 
rising) budgets? Why has Congress recently considered 
further action on DBOF? 
4. What are the impacts/implications of the rate 
fluctuations on the fleet users? Can a method be found 
for dampening the effects of the driving forces behind 
the rate fluctuations? 
D.  SCOPE 
This thesis is applicable to all fleet components of the 
U.S. Navy that utilize depot level maintenance. The thesis 
will: 
1. report the process by which stabilized rates are 
developed for depot level maintenance; 
2. explain the general workings of the DBOF and how it 
differs from previous revolving funds; 
3. examine the fluctuation of the depot repair overhead 
rate since DBOF implementation; 
4. provide conclusions and recommendations regarding the 
fluctuation of the stabilized rates. 
Due to the short time that DBOF has been in existence, it 
is not practical to conduct an extended statistical analysis 
of the stabilized rate fluctuations. Further research in this 
area will undoubtedly be of interest to the Navy and DoD in 
future years when more DBOF operating data has been assembled 
and as more support services are considered for inclusion in 
the Fund. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Numerous sources were gleaned for information and data on 
the DBOF. The methodology utilized here included an extensive 
literature search for background information on the structure 
of DBOF and the principles of unit costing. A search of the 
INFOTRAC and ECONLIT databases provided current articles and 
research theses on these subjects as well. 
Informal interviews with officers at Commander Naval Air 
Forces Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC) were instrumental in 
highlighting many of the concerns which form the basis for 
this study. Additional interviews with personnel at the Naval 
Comptroller's Office (NAVCOMPT) who deal with DBOF on a daily 
basis were also conducted. These interviews, with such 
persons as the Head, Revolving and Other Funds Branch, 
provided invaluable insight into how the rates are actually 
determined and why they fluctuate as they do. Any proposed 
changes will be based on the experience and opinions of those 
involved as well as the author. 
F. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This study will benefit the Navy by providing operating 
forces with an understanding of what DBOF is, how it operates, 
and how its rates are set. In the current environment of 
shrinking budgets it is imperative to know where each and 
every dollar is spent and to determine the appropriateness of 
that spending. 
This study will highlight what the Navy and DoD are doing 
with DBOF in an effort to save the fleet user money on support 
expenditures. By understanding the workings of the rate 
setting process, the fleet user will better understand how his 
actions affect future prices and can assist him in determining 
the amount and type of support he can afford. If the data 
shows that the rates do fluctuate excessively, it will provide 
a recommendation to dampen that fluctuation and ease the 
hardships associated with it. Additional research may provide 
follow on data as to the statistical significance of DBOF 
stabilized rate fluctuation and regulator actions. 
G.  ORGANIZATION OP RESEARCH 
This sections highlights the content of the remaining 
sections of this thesis. 
Chapter II (Background): Chapter II features the 
workings of a standard revolving fund as well as the DBOF. 
The activities that comprise DBOF, the magnitude of the fund 
and its attributes are also discussed. 
Chapter III (Stabilized Rate Setting): Chapter III 
describes the method by which stabilized rates are actually 
set. The macro level model used by NAVCOMPT to set stabilized 
rates for a business area is shown and explained. 
Chapter IV (Interpretation and Analysis): Chapter IV 
shows how the rates have fluctuated for a business area and 
discusses how the practice of rate setting detailed in Chapter 
III influences this fluctuation. 
Chapter V (Recommendations and Conclusions): Chapter V 
describes the impact that the DBOF rate setting practice has 
had on the fleet user. Recommendations and conclusions 
complete the chapter. 




The 1990 s have seen dramatic changes in the mili tary 
threat f aced by the United States With the fall of the 
Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the major adversary that the U.S. military faced off against 
and trained for has disappeared. Congressional budget 
analysts have seen these changes as a golden opportunity; a 
chance to cut military spending and use the "peace dividend" 
to finance a number of social concerns at home. The resultant 
military force downsizing has compelled the Department of 
Defense (DoD) to devise more efficient ways in which to 
operate. Every dollar saved through increased efficiency is 
a dollar that can be used by operating forces. 
The formation of the Defense Business Operations Fund was 
designed to improve financial information available to 
managers and to increase cost awareness (Maroni, 1993). DBOF 
was intended to squeeze every bit of utility possible from an 
ever shrinking military budget by instituting new business 
oriented cost management practices within the DoD. 
While the thrust of this thesis deals with the setting of 
stabilized rates, one must first understand what DBOF is and 
how it is structured. DBOF's strengths and weaknesses, its 
relative size in a financial sense, and the variety of 
business areas included in DBOF must also be grasped to 
understand its impact on the fleet. 
B.  WHAT IS DBOF? 
The DBOF is a revolving fund through which the military 
services finance and perform a variety of products and support 
services. For fiscal year 1993, DBOF was estimated to control 
the sale of goods and services valued at $81 billion and 
assets of $126 billion.  Approximately 360,000 persons were 
employed by DBOF activities (Byrnes, 1993). DBOF consolidated 
numerous separate stock and industrial funds into a single 
business management structure in order to concentrate 
attention on the costs associated with providing support 
services. DBOF is divided into subaccounts or "business 
activities". Each business activity is still run by the 
individual service. A list of the activities initially 
included in DBOF includes: 
• Supply Management (A, N, AF, DA) 
• Distribution Depots (A, N, AF, DA) 
• Depot Maintenance (A, N, AF) 
• Base Support (N, AF) 
• Transportation (A, N, AF) 
• Research and Development (N) 
• Printing and Publication (N) 
• Information Services (N, DA) 
• Defense Commissary Agency (DA) 
• Defense Clothing Factory (DA) 
• Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DA) 
• Defense Technical Information Center (DA) 
• Defense Reutilization and Marketing Service (DA) 
• Defense Industrial Plant Eguipment Center (DA) 
(Legend: "A" = Army, "N" = Navy, "AF" = Air Force, "DA" = 
Defense Agency) 
Some of these business areas were limited to a single 
service or agency even though they were performed by all 
services.  This occurred due to the fact that some services 
did not have that activity designated as a revolving fund 
prior to formation of the DBOF. DoD continues to evaluate 
other support functions for eventual inclusion in or removal 
from the Fund (DBOF Implementation Plan Report, 1992). 
What is a revolving fund? In layman's terms, a revolving 
fund is basically a "checking account" against which business 
activities can write checks. It is first established with a 
lump sum of cash, called the corpus. Activities in the fund 
purchase goods for resale or provide some service to 
customers. These goods and services are financed by drawing 
against the corpus. When those goods/services are supplied to 
customers, the customers are billed for the cost of the goods 
plus a modest charge to cover the costs associated with 
providing that service. When customers pay their bills, they 
replenish the corpus. Customers are generally combat or 
operating units who are appropriated operations and 
maintenance (O&M) monies with which to carry out their 
assigned tasking. This circular flow of money is where the 
revolving fund gets its name. The revolving fund process is 
illustrated in Figure 1. 
Working Capital Incur Expenses 
Remittances Bill Customers 
Figure 1.  Revolving Fund Cycle 
DBOF took the revolving fund concept one step further. 
After combining the stock and industrial funds into a single 
account, DBOF moved cash management authority to the DoD 
Comptroller level. This served two purposes. First, the 
services and the DBOF business activities were no longer 
required to focus large amounts of time and attention on cash 
management. They could now concentrate primarily on cost 
management, with the goal of reducing costs (DBOF 
Implementation Plan Report, 1992) . They were free to focus on 
providing the highest quality goods and services at the lowest 
possible cost. Secondly, they were free from the danger of 
committing an Anti Deficiency Act violation (commonly called 
a 1517 violation) while they were implementing DBOF. Service 
financial managers were cleared to proceed full force with 
DBOF implementation. DoD, by assuming cash control, had 
maintained 1517 responsibility upon themselves (Grant, 1995). 
Now that they are combined under DBOF, business 
activities have more incentive to bid on contracts that were 
previously under the purview of another service. For example, 
a Navy aviation depot that is relatively efficient is now free 
to bid on Air Force contracts and vice versa. This increases 
the inducement for depot managers to make critical business 
tradeoffs, such as new equipment purchases or facility 
modernization, necessary to increase efficiency and 
productivity. The customer has every reason to expect this 
competition to drive down his prices and has every incentive 
to go with the low cost quality producer. 
C.  STRENGTHS OF THE FUND 
DBOF has several formidable strengths over previous 
systems.  These include: 
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1. Support Funding Resides in Customer Accounts 
DBOF uses the simple business principle that customers 
with money determine what services they need and what 
tradeoffs they can make in order to get the most for their 
money. Customers will "shop around" for the best value. They 
can award long term service contracts to take advantage of 
economies of scale or maintain short term contracts to respond 
to changing market conditions. They can contract with other 
DoD agencies to keep the work "in house" or purchase from the 
private sector and take advantage of newer innovations and 
civilian expertise. The key point is that the customer, not 
a bureaucrat, decides. 
2. Support Organizations Become More Responsive 
Business activities that supply goods and services must 
become more responsive to their customers in order to remain 
in business. They must be willing to modernize, economize, 
and transform in order to provide high guality services as 
inexpensively as possible. Competition with other activities 
and with the private sector obliges managers to be creative in 
their responses to customer demands. If they are not, their 
competition has a good chance of robbing them of their 
customer base and eventually eliminating them from the 
business. 
3. O&M Programs Executed as Approved by Congress 
A major advantage of DBOF is the use of stabilized rates. 
Once the rates are set and announced, they are not altered for 
the duration of the fiscal year. This allows operating units 
to submit budget requests for the amount of support services 
that they can expect to afford for the year. For example, if 
COMNAVAIRPAC expects to overhaul 100 aircraft during a fiscal 
year, they will request funding at a stabilized rate for 100 
overhauls as part of their annual budget (Wallner, 1993). 
The stabilized rate reduces variation in the budget; the first 
overhaul of the fiscal year will cost the same as the last 
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overhaul of that year (provided all other factors remain 
constant). This allows units to execute the budget within the 
limits established in the appropriation laws. There are fewer 
changes and reprogramming decisions with the usage of 
stabilized rates. 
4. Serves as Alternative to Obligation Management 
DBOF business activity "budgets" are derived from a 
budgeted unit cost goal which is multiplied by the expected 
number of units to be produced. In execution, the budgeted 
unit cost is compared to the actual unit cost and then 
analyzed to evaluate performance and make management decisions 
regarding operations of the activity (Juola, 1993). Under 
unit cost, DBOF activities concentrate on cost per output, not 
appropriated "topline" execution. Any spending that does not 
directly result in more output will only drive up the 
activity's rates and make it less competitive. Keeping prices 
down benefits the customer and the activity. 
Under obligation management, any excess funds remaining 
at the end of a fiscal year would be spent for fear that they 
would be taken away in the next budget. This is the old "use 
it or lose it" budget mentality that is eliminated with the 
use of unit costing. DBOF activities are run on a break even 
basis over the long run; they can make a profit or loss from 
year to year. However, if they make a profit, the excess is 
returned to operating units in the form of lower rates next 
year. If they suffer an operating loss, that shortfall is 
passed on to customers as higher rates the following year. 
The result over time is a zero sum gain or loss. 
5. Highlights "True" Cost of a Good or Service 
Before DBOF, many business activities were providing 
services at well below their actual costs. Hidden "subsidies" 
made many services appear cheaper through the military than 
could be found through a comparable civilian supplier. Under 
DBOF, customers now pay for the full cost of the service they 
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order. Full or total costs include all the operations and 
maintenance, military personnel, investment, and depreciation 
costs of capital assets associated with these business 
activities (Alderman, 1993). No longer are hidden subsidies 
lowering the direct cost to the customer. The cost to provide 
a good or service remains relatively the same with or without 
DBOF. The manner in which the cost of that service is 
appropriated (to customers under DBOF; to customers AND 
providers absent DBOF) is the critical difference. To 
illustrate, consider Figure 2 which highlights some of the 
hidden costs associated with an average base plumber (Kalmar, 
1994) . 
Non-DBOF Plumber 
Price per hour = $2 3 


















Grand Total = $37 Grand Total = $37 
Figure 2.  Comparison of DBOF vs non-DBOF Costs 
When factors or subsidies such as those shown in the preceding 
figure are considered, the differences in supplying that 
service (DBOF vs non DBOF) guickly disappear. From the 
customer's viewpoint, DBOF initially appears to be more 
expensive; it forces him to pay more for a service.  However, 
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customers receive more money added to their O&M appropriations 
in order to cover those higher costs. Customers now have the 
power to decide what services they actually need based on the 
true cost of those services. 
6. Requires the Use of Capital Budgets 
For activities that participate in DBOF, the budget is 
divided into two primary parts: operating budget and capital 
budget. Investments in new equipment, minor construction, 
software, etc. costing more than a preset limit (currently 
$50,000) will be funded through the capital budget. Costs 
will be amortized or depreciated over a predetermined period 
of years (DBOF Implementation Plan Report, 1992). Major 
construction projects and capital outlays are still required 
to pass congressional muster. However the ability to make 
significant changes that require some capital investment 
allows activity managers greater latitude than before. They 
can now modernize or upgrade items in their activity in order 
to provide their services more economically. Prior to DBOF, 
not all of the various support activities had a capital 
budget, or this flexibility to improve. 
7. Requires Standardized Accounting Practices 
Another major advantage of DBOF is that it requires the 
increasing use of standardized accounting practices. The 
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 put a premium on 
developing more useful financial information that goes well 
beyond traditional obligation and expenditure data. There are 
more than 80 disparate, unlinked financial systems in use 
within DoD that are identified under the Federal Managers' 
Financial Integrity Act. Additionally DoD uses another 200 
ancillary systems to provide various bits of financial 
information (Maroni, 1993). Managers have never been able to 
operate with information from a centralized source. For years 
they have "gotten by" through pulling together necessary 
information from various sources.   Standardized accounting 
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practices will go a long way towards providing financial data 
that is timely, consistent, pertinent, and complete. 
8.  Criteria for Entry 
Lastly, DBOF has set criteria for inclusion into the 
Fund. To be considered for entry, a business activity must be 
able to: 
• Identify a specific output 
• Identify specific customers 
• Possess a cost accounting system that can accurately 
collect the costs of producing outputs 
Failure to meet any of the above criteria is grounds for 
denying an activity permission to enter DBOF. Additionally, 
any activity already in DBOF can petition for removal from the 
Fund if it discovers that it can no longer meet these 
criteria. 
D.  WEAKNESSES OF THE FUND 
Weaknesses found under the DBOF system include: 
1.  All Costs Treated as Variable 
One key weakness of DBOF is the tendency of appropriators 
to consider all costs as variable costs. Variable costs are 
those expenses that vary in direct proportion to the output 
(Hough, 1993). For example, the amount of fuel that a ship's 
boiler burns is directly related to the number of steaming 
hours that the ship is underway. Fixed costs are those costs 
that cannot be altered in the short run or do not vary with 
output (Hough, 1993). Pier maintenance is a perfect example 
of this. Whether a ship is present at the pier or underway, 
the pier must be repaired, painted, and otherwise maintained. 
There is no relationship between the amount of maintenance 
conducted on the pier and steaming hours performed by ships 
using that pier. 
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In the long run all costs are considered variable; 
facilities can be closed or mothballed; workers can be laid 
off or fired; and contracts can be canceled. But in the short 
run, a fiscal year for example, a certain portion of a 
business activity's costs are fixed. These are the costs that 
must be incurred to maintain an activity in existence at a 
minimum level of output. These costs must be paid even if the 
minimum level of output is zero (Hough, 1993). Figure 3 
illustrates this. 
„Variable 




Figure 3.  Comparison of Cost Curves 
Under current guidelines, activities cannot guickly lay 
off federal workers or close portions of their facilities 
without first going through an extensive approval process. 
This creates a situation where an activity commander cannot 
quickly react to a business trend, and could result in the 
activity becoming seriously under funded as customer demand 
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for a given service falls. Most services require the 
existence of fixed assets (machinery, supply stocks, tools, 
etc.) as well as variable assets (the number of workers). 
This situation is represented by the actual cost curve in 
Figure 3. Congress tends to view the situation in a long term 
mindset where all costs are variable. This is represented by 
the variable cost curve in Figure 3. Above a certain level of 
production, a windfall accumulates to the business activity. 
As customer demand falls, funding that is based on the 
variable cost curve will eventually not cover the costs of the 
activity's operations. If the reduced demand continues, the 
activity becomes increasingly non competitive. This situation 
could ultimately force the closure of a viable activity solely 
because the nature of the business requires a larger fixed 
cost component than that seen in other areas. 
2. Excessive Oversight Hurts Business Decisions 
Another weakness of DBOF is a result of the excessive 
Congressional micromanagement of DoD spending. Business 
activity managers are not allowed to make many of the 
decisions necessary to streamline and economize without first 
receiving approval from DoD, who must seek approval from 
Congress. This approval process generally takes time as 
Congressional committees and subcommittees mull over the 
nuances and economic impacts of those changes. Congress is 
well within their purview to be meticulous in making decisions 
that affect how taxpayer monies are spent. However, excessive 
time costs the business activity. Monies that could have been 
saved months ago are now be viewed as expenses. These 
expenses are then passed on to customers as increased costs. 
A perfect example is the hiring or firing of government 
workers. An activity manager cannot quickly expand or reduce 
the number of workers at his facility. The number of workers 
that an activity may employ is fundamentally capped (through 
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the use of "full time equivalent" toplines). To release a 
federal worker for the "benefit of the government" usually 
requires the payment of severance, payment to relocate that 
worker in another federal position, transition assistance 
benefits, etc.  As General John Loh stated: 
Some people rationalize...by saying that our 
support forces cannot be reduced by the same 
percentage or as quickly as our direct combat 
forces. Not so. Industry does it, and we must do 
it as well. 
These mandated costs are folded into the rates charged to 
customers while activity commanders continue to push for 
relief. 
3.  "Death spiral" of Demand 
The death spiral is another major weakness of DBOF. 
Activity budgets are based on an expected number of output 
units. If that expectation is not realized, the activity will 
suffer an operating loss. Operating losses from a previous 
year are recovered the following year through higher rates 
charged to customers. As those rates increase, the overall 
prices that the activity charges for its services also 
increase. As these prices climb, operating unit commanders, 
who have limited funds available, may economize and reduce the 
number of units that they submit for repair. The decline in 
the number of units submitted means that the support activity 
must spread his overhead costs over fewer units, thus driving 
up the per unit price even further. This again reduces the 
number of units flowing through the system thus resulting in 
another operating loss. Again the rates increase to cover the 
loss. The spiral continues until the activity either ceases 
to be viable or until an infusion of cash from an external 
source corrects the imbalance. To avoid this, managers must 
make the tradeoff decisions necessary to remain competitive 
and must do so in time to avoid the spiral effect. Failure to 
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do so could be disastrous. 
4.  How to Manage Excess Capacity 
With the implementation of DBOF came the question: who 
should pay for excess capacity? The services readily admit 
that some excess capacity must be maintained to ensure that 
the U.S. has the ability to respond to a mobilization. 
However, should the DBOF customer be expected to subsidize 
that war reserve capacity in peacetime? Ideally, DBOF should 
be competitive in the vein of private producers. Private 
enterprises would not maintain excess capacity unless there 
was an extraordinary or specific reason to do so. Otherwise, 
it merely increases overhead costs that must then be passed on 
to the customer. 
One reason why this is such a pressing issue is that 
infrastructure drawdown has not kept pace with force 
downsizing. This has created capacity in excess of our 
planned war reserve. By 1997, the defense budget will have 
declined by over 40 percent since 1985, and active military 
end strength by about 3 0 percent. In contrast, even full 
approval of the 1993 round of base closures represents a total 
reduction of only 15 percent in the domestic base structure 
since the closure process started in 1988 (Maroni, 1993). 
Operating forces require only a set amount of depot support. 
Maintaining additional facilities open adds to the overhead 
costs that are passed on to DBOF customers. 
To solve this problem, DBOF has resorted to funding 
mandated excess capacity through a direct appropriation. This 
appears to violate the spirit of DBOF however. A war reserve 
is figuratively a fixed cost. By directly appropriating money 
to cover a component of the business activity's cost 
structure, does DBOF remove the incentive for the activity 
manager economize? After all, the manager can attempt to 
"play" the system; he can argue that the amount of 
appropriation is insufficient to cover the actual level of 
19 
excess capacity and thus the appropriation needs to be 
increased. 
A possible answer to this is to increase the amount of 
depot maintenance awarded to private contractors. This would 
allow them to remain proficient in the current downsizing 
environment and maintain the skills they will need for future 
weapons purchases. However, this option poses risks as well. 
Pentagon comptroller John Hamre explains (Gregory, 1994): 
It could be cheaper in the near term to go private. 
But what happens if...the private company decides 
'Hey, I'm not making the 10-12 percent return on 
investment I want.'? 
In this scenario, if the government had drastically reduced or 
closed its facilities, it would have no recourse but to pay 
more for services from contractors that it may have been able 
to provide for less in government run facilities. Clearly 
excess capacity remains a difficult point to ponder. 
5.  Implementation Problems 
One of the areas in which DBOF continues to take 
considerable criticism is in its implementation. Three 
criticisms that are most often voiced are: lack of initial 
training for users, spotty DoD guidance, and the originally 
proposed timetable. 
Initially, there was virtually no initial training given 
to the customers and/or the producers as to how the DBOF 
concept was to affect them. Few of the participants knew 
exactly what they were supposed to be doing, especially those 
charged with implementation of DBOF and unit costing in the 
military departments (Jones and Thompson, 1994). This can be 
attributed to the fact that, by most accounts, DBOF was sold 
as a name change. Indeed, DoD comptroller Sean O'Keefe 
described it as such before Congress in March, 1991 when he 
testified: 
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By confining our approach to taking all the 
existing defense and military department stock and 
industrial funds into the Business Operations Fund 
for this year, we have cut down on the problem of 
having the procedures in place.... They will 
operate no differently next year than today, 
because those procedures remain the same. 
Reference and training materials are now being produced and 
are to be available for distribution in the summer of 1995, 
four years after DBOF's introduction. 
Secondly, there appeared to be little groundwork laid for 
DBOF from DoD. Almost no one outside the DoD Comptroller's 
immediate circle appreciated the need for changes in the 
responsibility structure and management philosophy (Jones and 
Thompson, 1994). Despite the requirement that DBOF operate 
under full cost recovery, there were few accounting systems in 
place that could accurately determine what the full cost of a 
specific item was. There were many hopes voiced for the 
success of DBOF, but no single high ranking "champion" was 
appointed or volunteered to ensure that a successful 
transformation took place. Indeed, in August, 1991, less than 
two months before its introduction, the General Accounting 
Office warned: 
In this context DoD is also proposing to establish 
a Defense Business Operations Fund to initially 
consolidate  its  industrial  and  stock  fund 
operations into a single entity The Fund would 
provide services to DoD customers and be reimbursed 
from the customers' operations and maintenance 
funds. While we believe the underlying concepts of 
the Fund to be valid, we have expressed 
reservations over whether DoD has adequately laid 
the groundwork necessary to ensure that the Fund's 
implementation would yield the benefits intended. 
Accordingly, we are encouraging DoD to develop and 
clearly spell out the policies, procedures, and 
controls it would put in place to govern the Fund's 
operations. 
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The GAO clearly held and published their reservations 
about the preparedness of DoD to successfully implement DBOF. 
Difficulties that have been experienced by DBOF would appear 
to bear out GAO's suspicions. 
Lastly, DBOF was implemented during the early days of the 
current force drawdown. Operational commanders were told they 
would be given additional funds to cover the higher prices 
associated with full costing: the same funds that formerly 
were appropriated to support activities as hidden subsidies. 
With that extra money these commanders were told to purchase 
the support services they required from DBOF activities. 
Alas, even as their O&M budgets were increased to cover DBOF 
expenses, the military budget as a whole was being sliced as 
a result of across-the-board force downsizing budget cuts. 
Operational units were given more money from one source only 
to have it taken away from another. As a result, these units 
realized virtually no increase in their budgets and many units 
faced drastically reduced budgets. With implementation, DBOF 
prices skyrocketed at a time when combat units were getting 
relatively the same or fewer dollars. To them the DBOF 
concept made no sense. DBOF appeared to drive prices up while 
budgets dollars disappeared. 
To add insult to injury, this situation took place in the 
post Gulf War environment. Many combat commands had deferred 
normal maintenance during the war and needed to submit units 
to depots in order to reduce the maintenance backlog. More 
units needing repair, at a time when the price per unit was 
rising due to full costing and budgets were shrinking, made 
for an unpleasant climate in which to launch any new venture. 
DBOF quickly struck a sour note with fleet users and has been 
blamed for virtually every problem since. A more thorough 
implementation plan could have alleviated many of these 
problems. 
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E.  SUMMARY 
In summary, the DBOF combines the operations of revolving 
funds, which had established themselves through 4 0+ years of 
DoD usage, with the concepts of unit costing and full cost 
recovery. DBOF requires business activities to recover the 
entire cost of conducting business through the prices charged 
to customers. It is an extremely large enterprise that 
controls over $80+ billion worth of support goods and services 
every year in roughly fourteen business areas. These areas 
range from supply management and depot maintenance to the 
commissary agency and clothing factory. The Fund touches 
nearly everyone involved with DoD and has numerous strengths, 
including: 
• Support funding resides in customer accounts 
• Support organizations become more responsive 
• O&M programs are executed as approved 
• Unit costing serves as alternative to obligation 
management 
• Highlights true cost of a good or service 
• Requires the use of capital budgets 
• Requires standardized accounting practices 
• Established criteria for entry into DBOF 
The Fund also has the following weaknesses: 
• All costs treated as variable 
• Excessive oversight hurts business decisions 
• Death spiral of demand 
• Excess capacity management 
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•     Implementation problems 
Chapter II provided the background necessary to proceed to a 
description of the rate setting process found in the next 
chapter. 
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III.      STABILIZED   RATE   SETTING 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With the theory underlying DBOF and its operations firmly 
established, the next task is to describe the actual rate 
setting process.  The DoD Financial Management Regulations, 
Volume 2B, illustrate how stabilized rates are set and serves 
as the foundation for this chapter. 
The DBOF first categorizes business areas into two major 
subgroups: Supply Management Business Areas and Non-Supply 
Management Business Areas. The former sets customer rates by 
merely adding a surcharge to the initial cost of goods 
supplied. The surcharge covers the various costs (such as 
warehouse rental, manpower expenses, operating costs, etc) of 
providing goods or commodities, while the initial cost of the 
good itself is that cost that the government must pay to 
acquire it for the stock system. The latter category applies 
measurable or representative unit outputs to cost data to 
arrive at a cost per output rate. Maintenance depots fall 
within the Non-Supply Business Management Area category and 
generally use units such as direct labor hours as their output 
measure. To proceed further, common terminology must be 
established. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
To remove ambiguity in the processes described later, 
several definitions are necessary for a thorough understanding 
and are provided below. 
The Accumulated Operating Result (AOR) is the term used 
to describe the profit or loss realized from the operations of 
a business activity. Since DBOF business areas are not 
intended to run a profit or loss over time, and if DBOF 
forecasts of operating levels are accurate, then ideally, the 
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AOR is to be zero at the end of the year. When AOR does not 
equal zero, a recoupment is added (either positive or 
negative) to the stabilized rates in order to bring the AOR to 
zero in the following year. 
The total Cost of Goods Sold (CoGS) is comprised of all 
costs associated with all outputs that will generate revenue 
in the affected year. This includes expenditures for 
materials, labor, machinery, and so forth. Put another way, 
CoGS refers to all dollars spent to produce revenue generating 
outputs for a given year. 
A Direct Labor Hour (DLH) refers to all work physically 
performed on a job to produce an output, measured in hours. 
It includes expenses for maintenance, repair, overhaul, 
testing and other direct work performed by all workers on the 
output unit. Direct labor hours do not include indirect 
expenses, general & administrative (G&A) costs, or other 
support work. These indirect costs are included in business 
activity overhead costs. 
Maintenance depots are required by DBOF to maintain a 
catalog, either electronically or in print, of the products 
and services that they provide. These catalogs furnish 
activity customers with the number of direct labor hours the 
depot requires to perform a given task. When this hour figure 
is multiplied by the stabilized rate for a given fiscal year, 
the fixed price for that good or service is established. 
Therefore these service catalogs are referred to as Fixed 
Price Catalogs. 
A
 Program Budget Decision (PBD) is the final approval 
document(s) from the DoD Comptroller that finalizes and 
approves the stabilized rates that business activities may 
charge customers. The PBD is passed down to each service, who 
then promulgates that guidance to each applicable business 
activity. 
Stabilized Rates are the final adjusted costs per direct 
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labor hour that customers are charged for goods or services. 
The rates do vary by business area. Maintenance depots then 
charge this rate for all new jobs that are accepted during the 
fiscal year, even if the work is accepted but not actually 
completed in that same fiscal year. Stabilized rates serve to 
protect customers from unforeseen inflationary increases and 
other cost uncertainties and to assure customers that they 
will not have to reduce programs to pay for potentially 
higher-than-anticipated prices (Navy Comptroller Manual, 
1993) . 
C.  RATE FORMULATION GENERAL DESCRIPTION 
DoD regulations mandate that customer rates be 
established by a general process that is summarized in the 
following paragraphs. 
Initially, each service carefully reviews all projected 
costs for operations for a given fiscal year, formulates the 
most cost efficient operation possible, and then proposes that 
level of operations. 
Secondly, customer requirements are projected, based on 
identified outputs such as direct labor hours, by product. 
These requirements include not only all work already 
programmed for the fiscal year, but all work anticipated to be 
accepted for accomplishment during the fiscal year. 
Next, the services must adjust their proposed rates for 
inflation, pay raises, and other program or policy changes 
required by Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) or Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB). 
Each service then submits expected costs, proposed 
program levels, and foreseen rate changes by business area, as 
part of their budget estimate submissions. 
Lastly, final costs, program levels, and rate changes are 
established by Program Budget Decision documents after 
adjustments are made to bring the Accumulated Operating Result 
27 
to zero for the budget year for each business area. 
As always, there is at least one proviso attached. 
Services are also permitted to develop, report, and use 
subsidiary rates as long as those rates are rolled into a 
single composite rate for business area rate setting (DoD 
Financial Management Regulations, 1993). This means that 
business activities may actually formulate several different 
rates for different services and then compile them into one 
overall stabilized rate for charge to the customer. 
D.  FORMULATION MODEL 
The "model" that NAVCOMPT uses to formulate stabilized 
rate proposals for Non-Supply Management Business Areas is 
best portrayed by Exhibit 7b from the DoD Financial Management 
Regulations and is reproduced on the following pages as Figure 
4. The model summarizes the completion of the steps that 
comprise the actual process of setting proposed customer 
rates. For illustration purposes, this section will assess 
the model in the context of setting rates for naval aviation 
depots (NADEPs). 
To commence, the Navy first establishes the total DLHs 
necessary to accomplish the fiscal year work program. This 
work program, also known as projected customer requirements, 
is the number of aircraft that the Navy expects to submit for 
depot maintenance multiplied by the number of DLHs necessary 
to perform the various jobs required on each aircraft. 
Customer requirements are broken into the following 
subcategories: 
• Current unfilled customer orders expected to be 
completed during the fiscal year (carry-in 
orders, backlog of aircraft awaiting depot 
maintenance) 
• Work in Process (WIP) that will be completed 
during fiscal year (aircraft that are currently 
undergoing maintenance that will be completed) 
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• New orders expected to be accepted and completed 
during the fiscal year 
• New orders expected to be accepted but not 
completed during the fiscal year (carry-over to 
next year) 
The Navy then subtracts the number of DLHs associated with 
carry-over orders from the previous year, as these have 
already been funded in the prior year. When summed, this is 
the total number of hours expected to be completed during 
budget execution. Model steps one, three, five and eight 
contain this procedure. 
Subsequently, the Navy estimates the total costs that 
will be incurred to complete the aircraft work program. This 
estimation process includes corrections for inflation, pay 
raises, and other mandated price adjustments. The Navy 
subtracts costs associated with DLHs that are funded from 
another source, such as direct appropriations. When these 
adjustments are tallied with materials, depreciation, employee 
salaries, and so forth, the total is the estimate of total 
CoGS. This portion of the process can be seen in steps two, 
four, six, nine and ten of the model. 
To set proposed program financing levels and initial 
rates, the Navy divides the total CoGS estimate by the 
programmed output or total DLHs. The result is an initial 
cost per direct labor hour, or an "initial" rate. 
Now that the Navy has an initial cost per DLH, they must 
adjust that figure for prior year gains or losses. This 
adjustment can be positive or negative, depending on whether 
the adjustment is meant to recover a previous loss or refund 
a prior excess, and is commonly referred to as the "surcharge" 
(although that is a term reserved for Supply Management 
Business Areas) or more simply "recoupment". This adjustment 













U   M 
W -~-< 





















ce tfl tfl 
X 
o X 
u x ^ K~ £ X 
E ra X CT) X 
o X X 
X bQ 
Q. t& tfi 
+ 
w 
3 u  w  m 
o <   JZ    tf) 
=c 
m   D   D 
O   XI 
o x <- E 
XI X -C - — ro X X 
-
1 
X 5 s/i *~ X „, 
X (/I *-- X X 
u 






Q X ■a X ** 
ra CO    »-s c 









-C u a 3 
Q..C 







c ra   o fc    0J 
XI ctl   "-> 
o i_   ra 
3 "D o Ol   t- 
"a 
T)   w "CJ XJ **" O t-   c 
"O 
O   ra 
<v > ai Q. O 
a. > 
3 c ra ■a o 3   ra 
u 
■   <A Ol o "O 
Xl — 
X >-T3 o aj X3   C 
OJ i-    C 
L-     3 a 
a. 
CJ 'Z CJ ■ — 
QJ ra -*- Q. W 
XI XJ 
c ™ ra o  aj o   E 
o E a. ra 
*-■ O   3 ■a £ XI ra  *-- 
XI CJ v) eo 
OJ XJ o 
a. CJ    Q. ra 3  — OJ o T)    0J 
Q. C XI X3 
m   ra u 3: 0J O    ül 
0J m   (_ 2 3    Wl 
X) t_   ^ Q. 
C XI Q. z   E ra o X)   E QJ O 
c ■- "a 
10 c ra  cj o 
o C H- rv. 
3 >. 0J £ 3 to 
o >■ 3 *-< 3 O O o a 
ai c  u 3   aj 
c l;    m z [_ ra > L. ra   i/) 
o 0j  • _ o "0 > w X! 
XI 3 t~ XJ o XJ XI 
XJ JZ o "o 
Oj       - O C/) 
XJ 4-j   en V) 3 
I ra   c V) 
u O 3 V) C c X) 
0> V) "Ö "O o XJ 0) tU   _ o ro 0J XJ    C o JZ L.   ro o 
EC aj   3 O QJ    U o 
o "D ra u o 
"O O o I  '■ 
TJ o — t_) XI o 
CJ o — < o 4> xi  ra "O 
Xi  a: a. OJ    OJ 
ro m *-i  >. C    X 
o ra o  a> o 
XI VI     Ol o ■-  c l_> ra U) ■     C 0J o 
o t/1 c — o O   u ra   o X) 
O TI ~o HI 
Q. u a C   3 a 0J !S)  ■ — ra C   t- 
C ra Irt   u 3 
OJ CJ ra 3 3    C 3 w u > 
E C C ■- u   <u 3=     X XT    O "Ö 
o o o   >. XJ c XI     i < 
3L E < Q    C «a:   >- 
3 O OJ ra OJ 




X X X 
X ^ x 
X X , 
X 













•+-         TJ 
-^            4f (- ZJ 
«0 0J         XI 
a >    • — >- >-              TJ — r\i  i- 
o CO                    Oi ,- 
o c  ••       a.      3    ■ ra       oi 
Q. —    O          4J         XI   »- Oi    0i TJ 
Oi 
"g ■—            U                    <TJ C   *-> IA   *->            U            (-    OI 
01 OJ am       ra       ra  >- (_          O    0( v
c 
W     L                                01 
01                    0)            >  
O   C          01 
—  TJ 
TJ ra O    Ol         Xl                    (0 ^-         41   Ol 
—      C                                      4J      U 4J  «J   0. c 
O Oi —       o       a>  oi >    01    D ■- 
C/J > t-    3          fc-          Ol — —    O   O    <U 3 
Oi O    O                       TJ •*- *J   u   u Xl O 
ol 
—         TJ          3 ra        oi =c 
"8 x: W  —          4»         12   i- 0» e  t-  oi u C    O          *-<                 X Of   ra        t- ra 
O ro — •*-        ro        ai   QJ c   (-   ai   ra 0 i_ 
<J ra              E       x:   C 01 XI r\j X» 
o Ol   01            -           *-< 01   0        01 ra    • TJ 
JZ           +s                    0> -LOU) -j 00 OJ 
o C *->        tf)        C x: a *-J *-- CL > 3                    41          ■-   j-» a:              ra OJ «-■ TJ 
o   >- O   O TJ   t- U   C 
«] C  XI          <A         TJ   C < w   «i Ol 4)    (0 
O  CO 01 ^            ..    (_            41  ■ — c x: XI 
(J 01 TJ    0>    0i TJ   *-■ 1-  *-   c   0 TJ to 
CL QJ >- ci i- TJ c a c 3   c   m — C O 
TJ  ai o c   —   oi   t-   ra   ai   o 0   41 — x: ra C/l 01 
OJ *J Oi ra — JZ   o        o ■- >.  E   Q. 3 L.    O- 
*J  01 c Q. 3             -  U   *-< 0 01   OJ 
(/i O ■-         3 «   ra   3 «4-      tf)      Ü1      (_ ra 
•i"? 1« f   «   1/1   4  >-          o ■-    3   OJ    O 01 OJ 01 —- 3:   c on   v>  OJ a >* 
TJ   (TJ (A TJ   2 -i       ^ i_  x TJ   i/l V)  <*- 
(0 01 TJ    E   O    L.            OJ    41 01  ra  0  t- 0 0 
v in o ra            o  t- TJ >       —  ra 01 CJ ra   0 
c i/i •*-   ra   < ■ .-    C          OJ 
~i i- a. TJ   oi             oi   o   ra *--  ra  i_  >* >* t- 
3    41 c JZ a w >      3 0 0 0)   01 a 
O    *-" o (TJ   *^    Of   3=            3   i^ 
x:   01 w j «  m u 0   ra  1/1   Qj E ra  QJ O    OJ 
a:   -ji   oi a   ra   c   ra Q.       C   01 3 ac x: —  JZ 
c O —             x: TJ — TJ 
t-    41   (0    3 
L.   *-> 
O   5 <        ^ ■+- ^ •+-   t_ TJ a 
XI   L. ra OJ         O         o   o 41    ol   Of XI 4J    >■ >- 
(D »*- at •• i_   3  ^v         c        •*- -C    3 TJ r4 XI %n ra —  t/>   L. —   i_ *-<            L-    QJ 
tA L.  ra oi   ra 3=   oi        u   L —   Cox: 1- -j- 
*J I ra  ai >.  >  J  Ü   C  XI   QJ CO 
O   —1 at  >. i.°5.2Sä x:   t- XI a a >. » *J    CL   Ol ra  a. QJ    Q. 
t_ O   ra oo   C  «^   C   • 41               c TJ Ol   Of 
.^-    41 ■    —               3        TJ 3    t/i — ■- O to  *J C   ^ 
a JZ O    O) TJ —   Q. OJ   a   Oi   ai O C/l ra  y) 
— TJ C    O   01  JZ   01  .c — ra        ra   3 CJ x: 
i_ &..S Of TJ   *-•   ^   X   *-•   i- >     -      TJ flj   Ol 0)   H- ifl 01          4)          l- TJ   C C a. o 2 rvj   oi       to        oi  ra 1-   41   ra TJ 0 t_ '^ 41 — 
<_    Oi O .    c  + —  i •  u ra   > x:   4i O TJ *-* TJ 
in   3 
O  -C >- ■-        ra   o   ro —' ■— t-< x; ra ■- 
m *->   oi   3 >+-   3   ai —•  *J        ui VI I-    > i_  > 
O   <A O — a:   CT       CTXi 0 —   OJ — 0 
u 41    3   —f    01    t-    01 TJ    01   1  CJ e Tj 01 TJ 
01 c  o r   i/i a        ra        o O   3    CL 0 
a> *J 
V) ^   Of       in   Jiffl f 01 a 01 E TJ *-> >■ ra  > 
01 i- ui        >- C          CO 41 tA  X> *-■ XI 
*-"    o Oi                 CL         Q.TJ 3 c 
v>  >. Cfl    t_ TJ ^    41   Q. 01   41    QJ   OJ C/l (J TJ QJ  TJ 
3 XI 3    Oi ai « r  *  wr u u —       —'   ra 3 o> u   OJ 
i— t— *~>  oi *-■  oi  ra 3 a:-' 3   *-- 
TJ TJ ■a (0 01                            CL in  0 —   QJ TJ 01   ra 
<   <t) < <*- «  —.  ^    .      Ol    ■    ■- 41  <   3  XI < z —' 0. — 
TJ o 3 •       ■                   C            U 3 3 
ra xi           —      — U 
.   > ■ ac 
ru o <ü 3        c X    O  JZ  — ro ^r  ra 1/1  ra 
*- TJ »- < (_) TJ       ra <-    >- •-    3 *- •-  CJ •— tj 
—   E 
3 c 
0 
O   O •H 
L. x: ■P 
rO 




4J   > 0 
O    . u 
Q) 
TJ   U 4J 
03 
0   ra Ä 
-   O 
>. i-) 
ra   QJ QJ 
B 
0 
>-   ■ +J 
01   ra W 
QJ   >~ D 
TJ U 












w E — 
o o x: 
a:   1-   x 
31 
zero.  Step twelve contains this procedure. 
By adding the AOR adjustment and the previous 
CoGSfigures, the Navy arrives at a new, adjusted CoGS (step 
thirteen). Simply dividing that adjusted CoGS by the total 
DLHs for the fiscal year yields the stabilized rate for the 
coming fiscal year (step fourteen). This is the proposed rate 
that NADEPs will charge for each DLH of work performed on 
naval aircraft. 
Lastly, the percentage rate change from the prior year is 
calculated for Business area management visibility. If 
initial estimates prove accurate, the percentage change should 
be small. This would indicate that initial Navy estimates of 
costs and expected DLHs were relatively close to the outputs 
actually realized. When that occurs, stabilized rates remain 
relatively flat and prices do not climb. 
E.  PERFORMANCE OF PROCESS 
As stated above, the Navy tracks costs and estimates 
DLHs. But who in the Navy actually performs those tasks? The 
answer is surprising. It varies by business area! The Navy 
does not have a single office or center where assigned 
personnel conduct these functions (Doyle, 1995) . In the case 
of naval aviation depots, the individual depots report their 
costs and direct labor hour data to Naval Air Systems Command 
(NAVAIR) via the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) 
database. NAVAIR is one example of a component that develops 
subsidiary rates. They contend that spreading costs evenly 
over all cost drivers, the "peanut butter" approach, does not 
correctly reflect the cost of doing business in each 
specialty. Therefore, for NADEPs, NAVAIR formulates initial 
subsidiary rates for airframe work, engine work, modification 
work, etc. Once these rates are determined, the initial 
stabilized rate is calculated by taking a weighted average of 
the subsidiary rates.   The weighing is done based on the 
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number of direct labor hours expected to be accomplished in 
each area. For example, if airframe work accounts for 25 
percent of the direct labor hours generally performed by 
NADEPs, then the airframe rate will account for 25 percent of 
the stabilized rate. NAVCOMPT then scrutinizes the proposed 
rates prior to forwarding them to DoD. Once adjusted at the 
DoD level, the rates are returned to NAVCOMPT in a PBD 
document for promulgation to Navy DBOF business activities. 
Assuming that the final stabilized rate (from DoD) varies from 
that submitted, NAVCOMPT returns the final rates to NAVAIR, 
who adjusts the subsidiary rates. 
F.  SUMMARY 
To summarize, stabilized rates are set through a multiple 
step process that takes into account: 
• Unfilled customer orders from the previous year 
• WIP that will be completed during the year 
• New orders expected to be accepted and completed 
during the year 
• New orders expected to be accepted but not 
completed until the following year 
• Inflation,  pay  raises,  and  other  mandated 
expenses 
• Prior year operating profits or losses 
Stabilized rates may be calculated directly or through the use 
of subsidiary rates. Due to the fact that various cost 
drivers contribute to overall costs disproportionately, 
subsidiary rates are often calculated and used to determine 
the stabilized rate. Thus, the stabilized rate can be merely 
a weighted average of the subsidiary rates. Finally, as an 
illustration, the stabilized rate setting process for naval 
aviation depots was described in the following manner: 
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1. NADEPs report the total DLHs, anticipated costs, etc 
necessary to complete work that is programmed for the 
coming fiscal year,, 
2. DFAS maintains this information in database and 
reports same to NAVAIR. 
3. NAVAIR develops subsidiary rates based on inputs from 
NADEPS.  Proposed stabilized rate is calculated. 
4. NAVCOMPT scrutinizes proposed rates, adjusts them, 
and forwards same to DoD Comptroller. 
5. DoD adjusts rates and returns PBDs with approved 
rates to NAVCOMPT. 
6. NAVCOMPT promulgates approved rates to NAVAIR. 
NADEPs informed of final stabilized rates by NAVAIR. 
Now that the rate setting process is known, the discussion 
will turn to an analysis of available data. 
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IV.  INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The most publicized complaint about DBOF has been the 
rapid boosting of stabilized rates. Indeed, the original 
impetus for this thesis came when COMNAVAIRPAC expressed such 
concern with the rates charged by naval aviation depots for 
depot level maintenance. During a visit to NAVCOMPT, the 
author of this thesis was fortunate enough to attend a 
briefing given by NAVCOMPT personnel, to staff members of the 
House of Representatives Survey & Investigations (HAC S&I) 
subcommittee. 
The HAC S&I staff members were keenly interested in 
several key questions: 
1. Why have the stabilized rates charged by NADEPs grown 
extraordinarily over the past several years? 
2 . How do DBOF practices or regulations specifically 
figure into the rapid rise in aviation depot prices? 
3. How does the Navy intended to correct the problem 
with the stabilized rates charged by NADEPs? Is pass- 
through funding necessary? 
The staff members confessed to not fully understanding the 
factors that went into the setting of stabilized rates nor to 
the operations of DBOF as a whole. The NAVCOMPT personnel 
present were perceptive to this and went out of their way to 
keep their answers informative and direct. The discussion was 
kept at a more theoretical level rather than degenerating to 
page after page of printouts and exhibits. The analysis that 
follows relies heavily on information distributed at that 
meeting as well as proposed rate calculations from the Naval 
Air Systems Command. 
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B.  COMPARISON OF YEARS 
The rates for fiscal year 1993 and subsequent years of 
DBOF operations are listed in Figure 5. Fiscal year 1993 will 
be used here as the base year because it was the first year in 
which rates were constructed under the DBOF model described in 
Chapter III. It also was the first year in which the Navy 
included environmental compliance costs as part of activity 
overhead costs. This was in keeping with the concept of full 
cost visibility; that DBOF supplied goods or services should 
reflect the full cost of production in their prices. Other 
services may or may not have included these costs in their 
cost computations. It was, additionally, the first year in 
which a recoupment could be charged to make up for prior 
years' operating losses or to refund excess operating profits 
via the rate structure. Previously this had been done through 
a lump sum refund method. Although FY92 was the first year 
under DBOF, it did not meet these criteria and thus will not 
be used for comparison. 
Fiscal Year Rate % Change 
19 93 $100.40 
1994 $106.24 + 5.8 
1995 $133.80 + 25.9 
1996 $110.42 
-17.5 
Figure 5.  Stabilized Rates by Year 
Figure 5 shows that the stabilized rates charged by naval 
aviation depots did experience a rapid rise from 1993 to 1995. 
To contrast this rapid growth, Figure 6 shows what the 1993 
rate would be in 1996 had it grown at a typical annual 
inflation rate of 3 percent. 
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1993 1994 1995 1996 
$100.40 $103.42 $106.52 $109.71 
Figure 6.  Base Year Adjusted for 3% Inflation 
Why did the stabilized rate rapidly climb through 1995 and 
suddenly drop to a relatively normal level again in 1996? The 
following analysis will shed some light on the subject. 
C.  ANALYSIS:  1993 to 1995 
Between fiscal 1993 and 1995, the stabilized rates 
charged by naval aviation depots for maintenance work 
increased by a substantial 31.7 percent. This far outstripped 
increases due to inflation and placed serious strain on the 
already overstressed operating budgets of fleet aviation 
units. A breakdown of general cost categories associated with 
naval aviation depots is shown in Figure 7. 
Category FY94 FY95 FY96* 
Funded DLHs 15,521,792 14,447,952 13,918,800 
JLSC 
Surcharge 
0 $26,556,000 $25,800,000 
Allocated 
DLHs 
16,389,510 15,400,436 14,382,243 
Recoupment -$33,999,000 $228,518,000 0 
Overhead 
Costs 
$824,154,000 $745,517,000 $681,815,000 
Direct 
Material 
$484,412,000 $716,163,000 $571,431,000 
Total Costs 
(in $000) 
$1,764,100 $2,097,169 $1,866,691 
* FY96 data is shown for trend comparison purposes only. The 
reasons behind the falling of the fiscal year 1996 rate will 
be discussed in a later analysis section. 
Figure 7.  Comparison of NADEP Business Area Costs 
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Two aspects about Figure 7 that deserve clarification are 
the Joint Logistics Support Center (JLSC) surcharge and the 
difference between allocated and funded direct labor hours. 
The JLSC is a joint command that is tasked with designing 
common software, computer and accounting systems, common 
criteria and specifications, etc. that will eventually be used 
by all services. DBOF activities are currently "taxed" with 
a surcharge in order to support their efforts. Allocated 
DLHs commonly exceed Funded DLHs as they include direct labor 
hours associated with carry-over orders from prior years 
(which are already funded) as well as direct labor hours 
associated with the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
effort, which are directly appropriated. BRAC funded DLHs of 
1,67 9,0 00 for FY95 and 1,3 03,957 for FY96 were subtracted from 
the DLH numbers expressed in Figure 7. 
Disregarding the JLSC surcharge which is charged to all 
business areas and was first charged to the NADEP business 
area in FY95, every major cost category affecting naval 
aviation depots showed a steady decrease in costs from 1994 to 
1995 with one exception, direct materials. Direct materials 
showed an increase of 47.8 percent over that period. 
Considering that the Defense Department was undergoing the 
largest force reduction since the 1920's during those years, 
the question remains, what was the Navy purchasing that drove 
aviation depot rates so much higher? 
To determine this, a review of a portion of the cost 
driver information maintained by NAVAIR for the period in 
question appears in Figure 8. 
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Driver FY94 FY95 % Change 
Airframe Rate $88.69 $114.35 28.9 
Engine Rate $220.10 $307.19 39.6 
Mod Cost Rate $64.82 $88.46 36.5 
Component Rate $184.38 $222.90* 20.9 
Engineering Rate $56.33 $77.32 37.3 
Other Rate $93.06 $112.91 21.3 
* FY95 component costs were broken into two categories that 
were previously reported as one. The rates have been added 
together, with consideration given to their relative 
weighting, for comparison purposes. 
Figure 8.  Comparison of Cost Driver Rates 
The reason that prices went up appears to be linked to 
the problems with the F404 engines used in several naval 
aircraft. As problems developed, rather than repair certain 
parts as had been the practice in the past, NADEPs were 
instructed to replace those parts, or entire subassemblies, 
for safety reasons (Doyle, 1995). The Aircraft Engine Life 
Reductions substantially increased engine costs. Engines had 
to be changed out and repaired more often than originally 
planned thus resulting in higher than anticipated engine 
costs. Additionally, engineering and consultation costs rose 
as contractor engineering support was necessary to help 
identify and rectify the engine problems. Modification costs 
rose as changes were made to engines to bring them up to 
specifications. Finally, as engines experienced maintenance 
problems, airframe maintenance costs also rose. This was 
caused by a number of maintenance actions that must be 
accomplished every time an engine is removed from the 
airframe. For example, as safety wires are removed and 
reinstalled, the holes strip out over time, requiring repair. 
Cannon plugs that are the primary electrical connectors to the 
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engine often must be replaced. Many of these plugs have in 
excess of 200 hundred wires, all of which must be reinstalled 
in a new plug. Solvents used to remove dye used in the non- 
destructive testing of airframe components, such as engine 
mounts, often remove paint which must be repaired to prevent 
corrosion. All of these airframe costs are directly 
associated with engine maintenance. All of the cost drivers 
mentioned previously experienced dramatic expansion, almost 
all in the mid 3 0 percent range. 
To a large degree, this unplanned engine work is the crux 
of the problem. Stabilized rates are based on an anticipated 
number of direct labor hours. Expected work program 
composition helps outline the assets needed for the coming 
year. For example, if NAVAIR expects to conduct substantially 
more airframe maintenance than engine maintenance, the 
stabilized rate will be weighted towards the less expensive 
extreme. If, in reality, the reverse happens, the activity 
will suffer an operating loss which will then be passed on to 
future customers in the form of higher rates. In this case, 
unexpected problems with a large number of aircraft engines, 
which are expensive to have repaired and which usually account 
for only a small portion of the usual workload, resulted in 
large operating losses for the NADEP business area. Had these 
problems been anticipated, the stabilized rates could have 
been weighted towards the more expensive extreme. As it is 
generally impossible to predict such occurrences, there 
appears to be no simple method of dampening this type of 
fluctuation. 
D.  ANALYSIS:  1996 
The proposed stabilized rate for 1996 (from Figure 5) 
shows the first decrease since DBOF officially came into 
existence. This can be attributed to the fact that the Navy 
is asking for "pass-through" funding from Congress in order to 
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bring the rates back down to a reasonable level. This funding 
is to be appropriated to the Operations & Maintenance account 
which will then fund the DBOF account directly for the amount 
of the pass-through (Doyle, 1995). Customers will still pay 
for the work that they order. They will not get a special 
rebate or direct price break in exchange for the pass-through. 
The pass-through is designed primarily as a one time 
correction of the price structure. As can be seen from 
comparing the 1996 rate (Figure 5) with the inflation adjusted 
rate (Figure 6), the general effect of the pass-through will 
be to restore the stabilized rate to a level consistent with 
general inflation. 
Another aspect of the pass-through is that it provides 
working capital to finance work that has already been accepted 
but not yet performed. When DBOF was first formed and the 
cash assets in the various revolving funds was combined, the 
Navy had over $6 billion in working cash assets. Reports vary 
over how much of that cash was recovered and reappropriated by 
Congress; estimates range from $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion. 
To recover from a cash loss of that magnitude, the Navy 
resorted to advance billing for work to be accomplished in the 
coming year. They then used that cash to conduct operations 
in the current year. Thus, every year since, the Navy has 
relied upon the revenues from at least a portion of accepted 
future work to finance current year work programs. Approval 
of the full amount of the pass-through will allow the Navy to 
finance more current year work out of current year dollars, 
and forego reliance on future year advance billing revenues. 
E.  SUMMARY 
To recap, an analysis of the discussion and data 
presented to staff members of the House Survey & 
Investigations subcommittee by NAVCOMPT personnel, shows that 
the stabilized rates charged by naval aviation depots have 
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increased considerably. The analysis showed that much of the 
blame on the upward spiral of the rates rested with the 
inability of managers to accurately predict fluctuations in 
the work load mix. The use of subsidiary rates to formulate 
an overall stabilized rates contributed to this problem. When 
unexpected increases occurred in the work load of areas that 
had a high subsidiary rate, the stabilized rate was improperly 
weighted and resulted in an operating loss. If this trend 
were to continue, the stabilized rate would spiral upward, 
attempting to make up lost ground from previous years. 
NAVCOMPT revealed that the Navy is asking for pass-through 
appropriations in the FY96 budget request that will allow the 
stabilized rate to return to a normal level. The pass-through 
funding would also be used to alleviate the need for so much 
advance billing of future work. It would provide some of the 
cash necessary to allow the Navy to fund current year work 
with current year dollars and not be so reliant on advance 
billing revenues. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
The DBOF officially came into existence on 1 October, 
1991. Since its creation, DBOF business activity managers 
have tried to make daily operating decisions in a commercial 
businesslike fashion. Chapter II recounted how DBOF combines 
the operations of revolving funds, both stock and industrial 
revolving funds had proven themselves through more than 40 
years of DoD usage, with the concepts of unit costing and full 
cost recovery. DBOF was designed to pattern support and 
maintenance operations after more conventional commercial 
enterprises. It requires business activities to recover the 
entire cost of conducting business through the prices charged 
to customers for support services and goods. DBOF is an 
extremely large enterprise which controls roughly $80 billion 
worth of goods and services yearly in approximately fourteen 
business areas. These areas range from supply management and 
depot maintenance to the commissary agency and clothing 
factory. The chapter continued with an explanation of a 
typical revolving fund and how DBOF differed from it. Some 
differences of DBOF that were mentioned included: 
1. The consolidation of cash management authority at the 
DoD level 
2. Freedom of business activities to concentrate solely 
on cost control 
3. Freedom to bid on contracts that were previously 
denied them. 
Chapter II also listed and expounded upon several of the 
numerous strengths of DBOF. These strengths were the prime 
movers behind the formation of DBOF and included: 
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Support funding resides in customer accounts 
Support organizations become more responsive 
O&M programs are executed as approved 
Unit costing serves as alternative to obligation 
management 
Highlights true cost of a good or service 
Requires the use of capital budgets 
Requires standardized accounting practices 
Established criteria for entry into DBOF 
How these strengths benefited the fleet customer and why they 
were preferable to the status quo was discussed. Five 
specific weaknesses of DBOF were also addressed. These were 
some of the key factors on which DBOF was initially opposed 
and included: 
All costs treated as variable 
Excessive oversight hurts business decisions 
Death spiral of demand 
Excess capacity management 
Implementation problems 
Overall, Chapter II provided the background necessary to fully 
understand the rate setting process described later. 
Chapter III describes the process of setting stabilized 
rates for DBOF activities. Stabilized rates are set through 
a multiple step process that takes a variety of inputs into 
account.  Some of the universal inputs are: 
• Unfilled customer orders from the previous year 
• WIP that will be completed during the year 
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• New orders expected to be accepted and completed 
during the year 
• New orders expected to be accepted but not 
completed until the following year 
• Inflation,  pay  raises,  and  other  mandated 
expenses 
• Prior year operating profits or losses 
Stabilized rates may be calculated directly or through the use 
of subsidiary rates. Subsidiary rates are often calculated 
for use by specific business area managers. They can also be 
used to determine the stabilized rate when various cost 
drivers contribute to overall costs disproportionately. In 
this situation, the stabilized rate is merely a weighted 
average of the subsidiary rates. As an illustration, the 
stabilized rate setting process for naval aviation maintenance 
depots is summarized as follows: 
1. NADEPs report the total DLHs, anticipated costs, etc 
necessary to complete work that is programmed for the 
coming fiscal year. 
2. DFAS maintains this information in database and 
reports same to NAVAIR. 
3. NAVAIR develops subsidiary rates based on inputs from 
NADEPS.  Proposed stabilized rate is calculated. 
4. NAVCOMPT scrutinizes proposed rates, adjusts them, 
and forwards same to DoD Comptroller. 
5. DoD adjusts rates and returns PBDs with approved 
rates to NAVCOMPT. 
6. NAVCOMPT promulgates approved rates to NAVAIR. 
NADEPs informed of final stabilized rates by NAVAIR. 
Refer to Figure 4 for a tabular version of this process. 
Finally,  Chapter IV analyzed the fluctuation of the 
stabilized  rates  and  the  underlying  causes  of  that 
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oscillation. This analysis showed that the stabilized rates 
charged by naval aviation depots have increased considerably. 
The analysis revealed that much of the blame for the spiraling 
of the rates was beyond the control of business managers. 
They were simply unable to accurately predict unexpected 
fluctuations in the work load mix. There is no method with 
which they can forecast the unexpected and thereby account for 
ways to react to it. 
Chapter IV also noted that the use of subsidiary rates 
also contributed to the problem of rising prices. Stabilized 
rates are weighted averages of subsidiary rates. If 
unexpected work load increases occur in areas that have a low 
subsidiary rate, the stabilized rate will be improperly 
weighted and result in an operating profit. If that same 
unexpected work load increase occurs in an area that has a 
high subsidiary rate, the stabilized rate will be improperly 
weighted and result in an operating loss. If this latter 
trend continues, the stabilized rate spirals upward. The Navy 
is currently asking for pass-through appropriations in the 
FY96 budget request. These monies will initially be 
appropriated to the O&M account. NAVCOMPT will then forward 
those monies directly to DBOF. It is expected that this 
appropriation will allow the stabilized rate to return to a 
level consistent with inflation. Pass-through funding would 
also reduce the need for much of the advance billing of future 
work that now occurs. It would provide a share of the cash 
necessary to free the Navy from reliance on advance billing 
revenues and allow it to finance current year work with 
current year dollars. 
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B.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
1.  Institute a DBOF training program 
For fleet users to fully embrace and use the DBOF system 
to their fullest advantage, they must first understand the 
goals and operating principles of DBOF. Junior officer 
schools (SWOS, OCS, AOCS, etc.) should require a basic 
understanding of DBOF as a prerequisite for graduation. 
Topics for these officers should include: 
• Revolving fund principles 
• DBOF strengths and weaknesses 
• Goals of the DBOF 
• Criteria for DBOF entry 
Department Head training should cover the workings of DBOF in 
more sufficient detail to allow those officers to make 
educated recommendations to the Commanding Officer on the type 
and level of services they require. Topics for these officers 
should include: 
• Stabilized rate setting and formulation 
• Budgeting for unexpected fluctuations in rates 
over the long run 
• Rebuttal  and  input  procedures  for  rate 
formulation 
• Documentation of problems requiring higher level 
attention or correction 
Additionally, the enlisted personnel whose ratings require 
them to operate in DBOF related areas, such as the SK rating, 
should receive this training as part of their class "A" school 
rate training. Proper preparation of the officers and men who 
use DBOF on a daily basis is imperative to its success. 
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2. Allow customers to purchase outside of DBOF 
By easing restrictions that require numerous services to 
be purchased solely from DBOF activities, operating units will 
have an incentive to shop for the best value for their support 
dollars. An often cited example of this is crane services. 
Ships that require crane services for antenna maintenance, 
heavy equipment removal, or other such task, currently must 
purchase those services from the local base public works 
center that supplies crane services. If ships had the option 
of purchasing crane services from a private vendor, Acme 
Cranes for example, the ship would have the incentive to shop 
for the best deal. Not only would this provide incentive for 
DBOF activity managers, in this case the local public works 
center, to make the tradeoff decisions that will increase 
efficiency, it would allow simple market pressure to keep 
prices low. In the end, the efficient producer gets the job, 
the ship receives service at the lowest available rate, and 
the Navy saves money. 
3. Appoint a permanent DBOF governing board 
Typically, creating an additional oversight office or 
layer of bureaucracy is not a popular alternative. However, 
DBOF needs a permanent leader to resolve its problems and 
force it, in a sense, to become commercially viable. DBOF 
oversees businesses that generate a combined $80 billion in 
sales of goods and services each year. As a comparison, 1995 
reported revenues for Sears, Roebuck & Company was $5 0.84 
billion, for General Electric was $60.6 billion, and for the 
Ford Motor Company was $108.52 billion (Standard & Poor's, 
1995). DBOF must have high level continuous leadership. 
Currently, DBOF has what can only be referred to as a part- 
time governing board. When problems arise, this board advises 
the Secretary of Defense on changes that could or should be 
made to enhance DBOF operations. Based on the state of rate 
fluctuations, it would not appear to be a stellar performer. 
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Specifically, a new, permanent governing board, that 
remains under DoD jurisdiction, could be set up on the pattern 
of the Federal Reserve Board. This board could be comprised 
of seven members who are appointed and Congressionally 
approved for terms of six, eight, or ten years. Their terms 
would expire at different intervals so that a core portion of 
the board would always be composed of experienced members. 
This structure would also alleviate the partisan politics that 
permeate political appointee controlled departments. Perhaps 
retired corporate executives could then be recruited to fill 
positions on the board. 
The permanent board would nominally report to the 
Secretary and be tasked with solving operational and/or 
structural problems within the Fund as well as defining common 
systems, developing common reports, and acting as the 
administrative head of the Fund. The board would retain 
authority to conduct business and would not be directly tied 
to DoD edicts. DoD would control force levels while the board 
would control support levels. Congress would continue to 
control any additional funding for DBOF. However, once 
appropriated, the monies would fall to the governing board for 
use. The governing board would operate DBOF as a service 
enterprise, making regular reports to the Secretary and 
Congress, publishing regular financial statements, and 
undergoing periodic audits. The benefits garnered from DBOF 
under this type of operation could be astounding. 
4.  Freeze further entries into DBOF 
DBOF is a tool for cutting costs. However, DBOF should 
be in place prior to budget reductions in order to avoid the 
blame for increased prices in a time of decreasing revenues. 
Implementation of DBOF in the current business areas was not 
done in this manner. It was implemented during the post Cold 
War drawdown and quickly gained a reputation for raising 
prices. While this reputation may be unfounded, it has led to 
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much resistance to expanding DBOF. Freezing further DBOF 
participation until budget levels stabilize, until the base 
realignment and closure savings are recognized, and until the 
support infrastructure has completed its contraction, will 
allow the services to become more adept at their estimations 
and projections, and to stabilize the fluctuations in the 
current rates. Further entries into DBOF, at this time, will 
only add another factor to the already overtaxed DBOF 
structure. 
C.  CONCLUSIONS 
DBOF was heralded upon its inception as the answer to all 
of the Pentagon's budget woes in the support area. 
Expectations were exceedingly high and have not been met by 
most standards. As such, many now look down upon the whole 
idea of DBOF and revolving funds as unworkable and unwise, 
even though they have been used successfully by the Navy since 
the mid 1950's. The point is that many of DoD' s financial 
problems would have existed whether or not the DBOF had been 
created (Maroni, 1993). 
Implementation can be described as full or partial. The 
long range goal of DBOF is full implementation, where all 
support services fall under the DBOF umbrella. The DBOF that 
is currently in existence is only a partial implementation. 
It is comprised of those activities that planners felt would 
make the transition to DBOF relatively easily. Full 
implementation of DBOF is necessary to realize the full 
benefits of the Fund. The proponents of DBOF claim that 
savings can accrue with only a partial implementation. 
However, full implementation would rely much more heavily on 
the market economics of supply and demand, economies of scale, 
and competition, which has proven time and again to be the 
ultimate vehicle for setting prices. Until that time comes, 
the partial implementation of DBOF that DoD is now using will 
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continue to disappoint those with expectations of success. 
Finally, DBOF must have a champion if it is ever to be 
fully implemented and to operate as planned. Without a high 
level manager or board that is responsible for day to day 
operations, business activities will continue to operate on 
piecemeal leadership, as they do now. Strong leadership, that 
has the power and authority to make necessary changes, is 
vital to the success of the Fund. Without it, DBOF is doomed 
to the chaos in which it is now mired. 
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